MITRE ATT&CK.
Threat Intelligence · Adversary Tactics, Techniques & Groups

Mitigations

267 defensive measures and the techniques each one counters.

T1156.bash_profile and .bashrc Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Making these files immutable and only changeable by certain administrators will limit the ability for adversaries to easily create user level persistence.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1156

T1134Access Token Manipulation Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Access tokens are an integral part of the security system within Windows and cannot be turned off. However, an attacker must already have administrator level access on the local system to make full use of this technique; be sure to restrict users and accounts to the least privileges they require to do their job.

Any user can also spoof access tokens if they have legitimate credentials. Follow mitigation guidelines for preventing adversary use of Valid Accounts. Limit permissions so that users and user groups cannot create tokens. This setting should be defined for the local system account only. GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Create a token object. Also define who can create a process level token to only the local and network service through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Replace a process level token.

Also limit opportunities for adversaries to increase privileges by limiting Privilege Escalation opportunities.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1134

T1015Accessibility Features Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

To use this technique remotely, an adversary must use it in conjunction with RDP. Ensure that Network Level Authentication is enabled to force the remote desktop session to authenticate before the session is created and the login screen displayed. It is enabled by default on Windows Vista and later.

If possible, use a Remote Desktop Gateway to manage connections and security configuration of RDP within a network.

Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed by an adversary with this technique by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1015

T1087Account Discovery Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Prevent administrator accounts from being enumerated when an application is elevating through UAC since it can lead to the disclosure of account names. The Registry key is located HKLM\ SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\CredUI\EnumerateAdministrators. It can be disabled through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Credential User Interface: E numerate administrator accounts on elevation.

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about system and domain accounts, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1087

M1036Account Use Policies · counters 7 techniques

Configure features related to account use like login attempt lockouts, specific login times, etc.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1036

M1015Active Directory Configuration · counters 14 techniques

Configure Active Directory to prevent use of certain techniques; use SID Filtering, etc.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1015

M1049Antivirus/Antimalware · counters 15 techniques

Use signatures or heuristics to detect malicious software.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1049

T1182AppCert DLLs Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through AppCert DLLs by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1182

T1103AppInit DLLs Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Upgrade to Windows 8 or later and enable secure boot.

Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through AppInit DLLs by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1103

T1155AppleScript Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Require that all AppleScript be signed by a trusted developer ID before being executed - this will prevent random AppleScript code from executing . This subjects AppleScript code to the same scrutiny as other .app files passing through Gatekeeper.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1155

T1017Application Deployment Software Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Grant access to application deployment systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of firewalls, account privilege separation, group policy, and multifactor authentication. Verify that account credentials that may be used to access deployment systems are unique and not used throughout the enterprise network. Patch deployment systems regularly to prevent potential remote access through Exploitation for Privilege Escalation.

If the application deployment system can be configured to deploy only signed binaries, then ensure that the trusted signing certificates are not co-located with the application deployment system and are instead located on a system that cannot be accessed remotely or to which remote access is tightly controlled.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1017

M1013Application Developer Guidance · counters 9 techniques

This mitigation describes any guidance or training given to developers of applications to avoid introducing security weaknesses that an adversary may be able to take advantage of.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1013

M1048Application Isolation and Sandboxing · counters 12 techniques

Restrict execution of code to a virtual environment on or in transit to an endpoint system.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1048

T1138Application Shimming Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

There currently aren't a lot of ways to mitigate application shimming. Disabling the Shim Engine isn't recommended because Windows depends on shimming for interoperability and software may become unstable or not work. Microsoft released an optional patch update - KB3045645 - that will remove the "auto-elevate" flag within the sdbinst.exe. This will prevent use of application shimming to bypass UAC.

Changing UAC settings to "Always Notify" will give the user more visibility when UAC elevation is requested, however, this option will not be popular among users due to the constant UAC interruptions.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1138

T1010Application Window Discovery Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1010

T1123Audio Capture Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Mitigating this technique specifically may be difficult as it requires fine-grained API control. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system.

Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to record audio by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1123

M1047Audit · counters 78 techniques

Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses.

T1021.001 Remote Desktop ProtocolT1021.005 VNCT1027 Obfuscated Files or InformationT1027.011 Fileless StorageT1053 Scheduled Task/JobT1053.002 AtT1053.003 CronT1053.005 Scheduled TaskT1059.006 PythonT1070.008 Clear Mailbox DataT1087.004 Cloud AccountT1114 Email CollectionT1114.003 Email Forwarding RuleT1176 Browser ExtensionsT1204.003 Malicious ImageT1213 Data from Information RepositoriesT1213.001 ConfluenceT1213.002 SharepointT1213.003 Code RepositoriesT1482 Domain Trust DiscoveryT1484 Domain Policy ModificationT1484.001 Group Policy ModificationT1505 Server Software ComponentT1505.001 SQL Stored ProceduresT1505.002 Transport AgentT1505.004 IIS ComponentsT1505.005 Terminal Services DLLT1525 Implant Internal ImageT1528 Steal Application Access TokenT1530 Data from Cloud StorageT1542.004 ROMMONkitT1542.005 TFTP BootT1543 Create or Modify System ProcessT1543.003 Windows ServiceT1543.004 Launch DaemonT1546.006 LC_LOAD_DYLIB AdditionT1548 Abuse Elevation Control MechanismT1548.002 Bypass User Account ControlT1550.001 Application Access TokenT1552 Unsecured CredentialsT1552.001 Credentials In FilesT1552.002 Credentials in RegistryT1552.004 Private KeysT1552.006 Group Policy PreferencesT1552.008 Chat MessagesT1556 Modify Authentication ProcessT1556.006 Multi-Factor AuthenticationT1556.007 Hybrid IdentityT1556.008 Network Provider DLLT1558.004 AS-REP RoastingT1560 Archive Collected DataT1560.001 Archive via UtilityT1562 Impair DefensesT1562.002 Disable Windows Event LoggingT1562.004 Disable or Modify System FirewallT1562.007 Disable or Modify Cloud FirewallT1563.002 RDP HijackingT1564.008 Email Hiding RulesT1566.002 Spearphishing LinkT1574 Hijack Execution FlowT1574.001 DLL Search Order HijackingT1574.005 Executable Installer File Permissions WeaknessT1574.007 Path Interception by PATH Environment VariableT1574.008 Path Interception by Search Order HijackingT1574.009 Path Interception by Unquoted PathT1574.010 Services File Permissions WeaknessT1578 Modify Cloud Compute InfrastructureT1578.001 Create SnapshotT1578.002 Create Cloud InstanceT1578.003 Delete Cloud InstanceT1593 Search Open Websites/DomainsT1593.003 Code RepositoriesT1606 Forge Web CredentialsT1606.001 Web CookiesT1606.002 SAML TokensT1610 Deploy ContainerT1612 Build Image on HostT1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1047

T1131Authentication Package Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, and later versions, may make LSA run as a Protected Process Light (PPL) by setting the Registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\RunAsPPL, which requires all DLLs loaded by LSA to be signed by Microsoft.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1131

T1119Automated Collection Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Encryption and off-system storage of sensitive information may be one way to mitigate collection of files, but may not stop an adversary from acquiring the information if an intrusion persists over a long period of time and the adversary is able to discover and access the data through other means. A keylogger installed on a system may be able to intercept passwords through Input Capture and be used to decrypt protected documents that an adversary may have collected. Strong passwords should be used to prevent offline cracking of encrypted documents through Brute Force techniques.

Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect files and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1119

T1020Automated Exfiltration Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify unnecessary system utilities, scripts, or potentially malicious software that may be used to transfer data outside of a network, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1020

T1139Bash History Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

There are multiple methods of preventing a user's command history from being flushed to their .bash_history file, including use of the following commands: set +o history and set -o history to start logging again; unset HISTFILE being added to a user's .bash_rc file; and ln -s /dev/null ~/.bash_history to write commands to /dev/nullinstead.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1139

M1040Behavior Prevention on Endpoint · counters 46 techniques

Use capabilities to prevent suspicious behavior patterns from occurring on endpoint systems. This could include suspicious process, file, API call, etc. behavior.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1040

T1009Binary Padding Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify potentially malicious software that may be executed from a padded or otherwise obfuscated binary, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1009

T1197BITS Jobs Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, disabling all BITS functionality will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software patching and updating. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior.

Modify network and/or host firewall rules, as well as other network controls, to only allow legitimate BITS traffic.

Consider limiting access to the BITS interface to specific users or groups.

Consider reducing the default BITS job lifetime in Group Policy or by editing the JobInactivityTimeout and MaxDownloadTime Registry values in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\BITS.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1197

M1046Boot Integrity · counters 11 techniques

Use secure methods to boot a system and verify the integrity of the operating system and loading mechanisms.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1046

T1067Bootkit Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Ensure proper permissions are in place to help prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to perform this action. Use Trusted Platform Module technology and a secure or trusted boot process to prevent system integrity from being compromised.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1067

T1217Browser Bookmark Discovery Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

File system activity is a common part of an operating system, so it is unlikely that mitigation would be appropriate for this technique. For example, mitigating accesses to browser bookmark files will likely have unintended side effects such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior. It may still be beneficial to identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1217

T1176Browser Extensions Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Only install browser extensions from trusted sources that can be verified. Ensure extensions that are installed are the intended ones as many malicious extensions will masquerade as legitimate ones.

Browser extensions for some browsers can be controlled through Group Policy. Set a browser extension white or black list as appropriate for your security policy.

Change settings to prevent the browser from installing extensions without sufficient permissions.

Close out all browser sessions when finished using them.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1176

T1110Brute Force Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Set account lockout policies after a certain number of failed login attempts to prevent passwords from being guessed. Too strict a policy can create a denial of service condition and render environments un-usable, with all accounts being locked-out permanently. Use multifactor authentication. Follow best practices for mitigating access to Valid Accounts

Refer to NIST guidelines when creating passwords.

Where possible, also enable multi factor authentication on external facing services.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1110

T1088Bypass User Account Control Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Remove users from the local administrator group on systems. Although UAC bypass techniques exist, it is still prudent to use the highest enforcement level for UAC when possible and mitigate bypass opportunities that exist with techniques such as DLL Search Order Hijacking.

Check for common UAC bypass weaknesses on Windows systems to be aware of the risk posture and address issues where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1088

T1042Change Default File Association Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Direct mitigation of this technique is not recommended since it is a legitimate function that can be performed by users for software preferences. Follow Microsoft's best practices for file associations.

Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed by this technique using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1042

T1146Clear Command History Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Preventing users from deleting or writing to certain files can stop adversaries from maliciously altering their ~/.bash_history files. Additionally, making these environment variables readonly can make sure that the history is preserved .

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1146

T1115Clipboard Data Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Instead of blocking software based on clipboard capture behavior, identify potentially malicious software that may contain this functionality, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1115

T1191CMSTP Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

CMSTP.exe may not be necessary within a given environment (unless using it for VPN connection installation). Consider using application whitelisting configured to block execution of CMSTP.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1191

M1045Code Signing · counters 20 techniques

Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1045

T1116Code Signing Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Process whitelisting and trusted publishers to verify authenticity of software can help prevent signed malicious or untrusted code from executing on a system.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1116

T1043Commonly Used Port Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1043

T1092Communication Through Removable Media Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary. Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if they are not required for business operations.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1092

T1500Compile After Delivery Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

This type of technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls or patched since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, blocking all file compilation may have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate OS frameworks and code development mechanisms from operating properly. Consider removing compilers if not needed, otherwise efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to decrypt, deobfuscate, decode, and compile files or information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1500

T1223Compiled HTML File Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Consider blocking download/transfer and execution of potentially uncommon file types known to be used in adversary campaigns, such as CHM files. Also consider using application whitelisting to prevent execution of hh.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1223

T1109Component Firmware Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts or access necessary to perform this technique.

Consider removing and replacing system components suspected of being compromised.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1109

T1122Component Object Model Hijacking Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Direct mitigation of this technique may not be recommended for a particular environment since COM objects are a legitimate part of the operating system and installed software. Blocking COM object changes may have unforeseen side effects to legitimate functionality.

Instead, identify and block potentially malicious software that may execute, or be executed by, this technique using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1122

T1196Control Panel Items Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific Windows API calls and/or execution of particular file extensions will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., drivers and configuration tools) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior.

Restrict storage and execution of Control Panel items to protected directories, such as C:\Windows, rather than user directories.

Index known safe Control Panel items and block potentially malicious software using whitelisting tools like AppLocker that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown executable files.

Consider fully enabling User Account Control (UAC) to impede system-wide changes from illegitimate administrators.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1196

T1136Create Account Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Use and enforce multifactor authentication. Follow guidelines to prevent or limit adversary access to Valid Accounts that may be used to create privileged accounts within an environment.

Adversaries that create local accounts on systems may have limited access within a network if access levels are properly locked down. These accounts may only be needed for persistence on individual systems and their usefulness depends on the utility of the system they reside on.

Protect domain controllers by ensuring proper security configuration for critical servers. Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to these systems. Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1136

M1043Credential Access Protection · counters 8 techniques

Use capabilities to prevent successful credential access by adversaries; including blocking forms of credential dumping.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1043

T1003Credential Dumping Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

### Windows Monitor/harden access to LSASS and SAM table with tools that allow process whitelisting. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent lateral movement opportunities using Valid Accounts if passwords and hashes are obtained. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers.

On Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, enable Protected Process Light for LSA.

Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to dump credentials by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

With Windows 10, Microsoft implemented new protections called Credential Guard to protect the LSA secrets that can be used to obtain credentials through forms of credential dumping. It is not configured by default and has hardware and firmware system requirements. It also does not protect against all forms of credential dumping.

Manage the access control list for “Replicating Directory Changes” and other permissions associated with domain controller replication.

Consider disabling or restricting NTLM traffic.

### Linux Scraping the passwords from memory requires root privileges. Follow best practices in restricting access to escalated privileges to avoid hostile programs from accessing such sensitive regions of memory.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1003

T1081Credentials in Files Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Establish an organizational policy that prohibits password storage in files. Ensure that developers and system administrators are aware of the risk associated with having plaintext passwords in software configuration files that may be left on endpoint systems or servers. Preemptively search for files containing passwords and remove when found. Restrict file shares to specific directories with access only to necessary users. Remove vulnerable Group Policy Preferences.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1081

T1214Credentials in Registry Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Do not store credentials within the Registry. Proactively search for credentials within Registry keys and attempt to remediate the risk. If necessary software must store credentials, then ensure those accounts have limited permissions so they cannot be abused if obtained by an adversary.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1214

T1094Custom Command and Control Protocol Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports and through proper network gateway systems. Also ensure hosts are only provisioned to communicate over authorized interfaces.

Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1094

T1024Custom Cryptographic Protocol Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Since the custom protocol used may not adhere to typical protocol standards, there may be opportunities to signature the traffic on a network level for detection. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1024

M1053Data Backup · counters 9 techniques

Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1053

T1002Data Compressed Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to compress files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

If network intrusion prevention or data loss prevention tools are set to block specific file types from leaving the network over unencrypted channels, then an adversary may move to an encrypted channel.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1002

T1488Data Destruction Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Consider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for taking regular data backups that can be used to restore organizational data. Ensure backups are stored off system and is protected from common methods adversaries may use to gain access and destroy the backups to prevent recovery.

Identify potentially malicious software and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1488

T1132Data Encoding Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1132

T1486Data Encrypted for Impact Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Consider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for regularly taking and testing data backups that can be used to restore organizational data.

In some cases, the means to decrypt files affected by a ransomware campaign is released to the public. Research trusted sources for public releases of decryptor tools/keys to reverse the effects of ransomware.

Identify potentially malicious software and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1486

T1022Data Encrypted Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to encrypt files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1022

T1213Data from Information Repositories Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

To mitigate adversary access to information repositories for collection:

* Develop and publish policies that define acceptable information to be stored * Appropriate implementation of access control mechanisms that include both authentication and appropriate authorization * Enforce the principle of least-privilege * Periodic privilege review of accounts * Mitigate access to Valid Accounts that may be used to access repositories

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1213

T1005Data from Local System Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from the local system, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1005

T1039Data from Network Shared Drive Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from a network share, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1039

T1025Data from Removable Media Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from removable media, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1025

M1057Data Loss Prevention · counters 9 techniques

Use a data loss prevention (DLP) strategy to categorize sensitive data, identify data formats indicative of personal identifiable information (PII), and restrict exfiltration of sensitive data.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1057

T1001Data Obfuscation Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1001

T1074Data Staged Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify system utilities, remote access or third-party tools, users or potentially malicious software that may be used to store compressed or encrypted data in a publicly writeable directory, central location, or commonly used staging directories (e.g. recycle bin) that is indicative of non-standard behavior, and audit and/or block them by using file integrity monitoring tools where appropriate. Consider applying data size limits or blocking file writes of common compression and encryption utilities such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib on frequently used staging directories or central locations and monitor attempted violations of those restrictions.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1074

T1030Data Transfer Size Limits Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1030

T1207DCShadow Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of AD design features. For example, mitigating specific AD API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing DC replication from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identification of subsequent malicious behavior.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1207

T1491Defacement Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Implementing best practices for websites such as defending against Exploit Public-Facing Application . Consider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for taking regular data backups that can be used to restore organizational data. (Ready.gov IT DRP) Ensure backups are stored off system and is protected from common methods adversaries may use to gain access and destroy the backups to prevent recovery.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1491

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to deobfuscate or decode files or information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1140

M1042Disable or Remove Feature or Program · counters 59 techniques

Remove or deny access to unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software to prevent abuse by adversaries.

T1011.001 Exfiltration Over BluetoothT1021.001 Remote Desktop ProtocolT1021.003 Distributed Component Object ModelT1021.004 SSHT1021.005 VNCT1021.006 Windows Remote ManagementT1046 Network Service DiscoveryT1052 Exfiltration Over Physical MediumT1052.001 Exfiltration over USBT1059 Command and Scripting InterpreterT1059.001 PowerShellT1059.005 Visual BasicT1059.007 JavaScriptT1091 Replication Through Removable MediaT1092 Communication Through Removable MediaT1098.002 Additional Email Delegate PermissionsT1098.004 SSH Authorized KeysT1114.003 Email Forwarding RuleT1127 Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy ExecutionT1127.001 MSBuildT1133 External Remote ServicesT1137 Office Application StartupT1137.001 Office Template MacrosT1205 Traffic SignalingT1210 Exploitation of Remote ServicesT1218 System Binary Proxy ExecutionT1218.003 CMSTPT1218.004 InstallUtilT1218.005 MshtaT1218.007 MsiexecT1218.008 OdbcconfT1218.009 Regsvcs/RegasmT1218.012 VerclsidT1218.013 MavinjectT1218.014 MMCT1221 Template InjectionT1505 Server Software ComponentT1505.003 Web ShellT1546.002 ScreensaverT1546.014 EmondT1547.007 Re-opened ApplicationsT1552.005 Cloud Instance Metadata APIT1553.005 Mark-of-the-Web BypassT1555.004 Windows Credential ManagerT1557 Adversary-in-the-MiddleT1557.001 LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB RelayT1557.002 ARP Cache PoisoningT1559 Inter-Process CommunicationT1559.002 Dynamic Data ExchangeT1562.010 Downgrade AttackT1563 Remote Service Session HijackingT1563.001 SSH HijackingT1563.002 RDP HijackingT1564.006 Run Virtual InstanceT1564.007 VBA StompingT1595.003 Wordlist ScanningT1609 Container Administration CommandT1611 Escape to HostT1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1042

T1089Disabling Security Tools Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Ensure proper process, registry, and file permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with security services.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1089

T1175Distributed Component Object Model Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Modify Registry settings (directly or using Dcomcnfg.exe) in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\AppID\{AppID_GUID} associated with the process-wide security of individual COM applications.

Modify Registry settings (directly or using Dcomcnfg.exe) in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Ole associated with system-wide security defaults for all COM applications that do no set their own process-wide security.

Consider disabling DCOM through Dcomcnfg.exe.

Enable Windows firewall, which prevents DCOM instantiation by default.

Ensure all COM alerts and Protected View are enabled.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1175

T1038DLL Search Order Hijacking Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Disallow loading of remote DLLs. This is included by default in Windows Server 2012+ and is available by patch for XP+ and Server 2003+. Path Algorithm

Enable Safe DLL Search Mode to force search for system DLLs in directories with greater restrictions (e.g. %SYSTEMROOT%)to be used before local directory DLLs (e.g. a user's home directory). The Safe DLL Search Mode can be enabled via Group Policy at Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Administrative Templates > MSS (Legacy): MSS: (SafeDllSearchMode) Enable Safe DLL search mode. The associated Windows Registry key for this is located at HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\SafeDLLSearchMode

Use auditing tools capable of detecting DLL search order hijacking opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for DLL hijacking weaknesses.

Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through search order hijacking by using whitelisting tools like AppLocker that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1038

T1073DLL Side-Loading Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Update software regularly. Install software in write-protected locations. Use the program sxstrace.exe that is included with Windows along with manual inspection to check manifest files for side-loading vulnerabilities in software.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1073

M1055Do Not Mitigate · counters 2 techniques

This category is to associate techniques that mitigation might increase risk of compromise and therefore mitigation is not recommended.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1055

T1172Domain Fronting Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

If it is possible to inspect HTTPS traffic, the captures can be analyzed for connections that appear to be Domain Fronting.

In order to use domain fronting, attackers will likely need to deploy additional tools to compromised systems. It may be possible to detect or prevent the installation of these tools with Host-based solutions.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1172

T1483Domain Generation Algorithms Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

This technique may be difficult to mitigate since the domains can be registered just before they are used, and disposed shortly after. Malware researchers can reverse-engineer malware variants that use DGAs and determine future domains that the malware will attempt to contact, but this is a time and resource intensive effort. Malware is also increasingly incorporating seed values that can be unique for each instance, which would then need to be determined to extract future generated domains. In some cases, the seed that a particular sample uses can be extracted from DNS traffic. Even so, there can be thousands of possible domains generated per day; this makes it impractical for defenders to preemptively register all possible C2 domains due to the cost. In some cases a local DNS sinkhole may be used to help prevent DGA-based command and control at a reduced cost.

Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1483

T1482Domain Trust Discovery Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Map the trusts within existing domains/forests and keep trust relationships to a minimum. Employ network segmentation for sensitive domains.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1482

T1189Drive-by Compromise Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Drive-by compromise relies on there being a vulnerable piece of software on the client end systems. Use modern browsers with security features turned on. Ensure all browsers and plugins kept updated can help prevent the exploit phase of this technique.

For malicious code served up through ads, adblockers can help prevent that code from executing in the first place. Script blocking extensions can help prevent the execution of JavaScript that may commonly be used during the exploitation process.

Browser sandboxes can be used to mitigate some of the impact of exploitation, but sandbox escapes may still exist.

Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of client-side exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist.

Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1189

T1157Dylib Hijacking Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Prevent users from being able to write files to the search paths for applications, both in the folders where applications are run from and the standard dylib folders. If users can't write to these directories, then they can't intercept the search path.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1157

T1173Dynamic Data Exchange Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Registry keys specific to Microsoft Office feature control security can be set to disable automatic DDE/OLE execution. Microsoft also created, and enabled by default, Registry keys to completely disable DDE execution in Word and Excel.

Ensure Protected View is enabled and consider disabling embedded files in Office programs, such as OneNote, not enrolled in Protected View.

On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to prevent DDE attacks and spawning of child processes from Office programs.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1173

T1114Email Collection Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Use of encryption provides an added layer of security to sensitive information sent over email. Encryption using public key cryptography requires the adversary to obtain the private certificate along with an encryption key to decrypt messages.

Use of two-factor authentication for public-facing webmail servers is also a recommended best practice to minimize the usefulness of user names and passwords to adversaries.

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect email data files or access the corporate email server, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1114

M1041Encrypt Sensitive Information · counters 29 techniques

Protect sensitive information with strong encryption.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1041

T1499Endpoint Denial of Service Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Leverage services provided by Content Delivery Networks (CDN) or providers specializing in DoS mitigations to filter traffic upstream from services. Filter boundary traffic by blocking source addresses sourcing the attack, blocking ports that are being targeted, or blocking protocols being used for transport. To defend against SYN floods, enable SYN Cookies.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1499

M1039Environment Variable Permissions · counters 2 techniques

Prevent modification of environment variables by unauthorized users and groups.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1039

T1480Environmental Keying Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

This technique likely should not be mitigated with preventative controls because it may protect unintended targets from being compromised. If targeted, efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior if compromised.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1480

M1038Execution Prevention · counters 66 techniques

Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.

T1036 MasqueradingT1036.005 Match Legitimate Name or LocationT1036.008 Masquerade File TypeT1047 Windows Management InstrumentationT1059 Command and Scripting InterpreterT1059.001 PowerShellT1059.002 AppleScriptT1059.003 Windows Command ShellT1059.004 Unix ShellT1059.005 Visual BasicT1059.006 PythonT1059.007 JavaScriptT1059.008 Network Device CLIT1059.009 Cloud APIT1068 Exploitation for Privilege EscalationT1080 Taint Shared ContentT1106 Native APIT1127 Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy ExecutionT1127.001 MSBuildT1129 Shared ModulesT1176 Browser ExtensionsT1204 User ExecutionT1204.002 Malicious FileT1216 System Script Proxy ExecutionT1216.001 PubPrnT1218 System Binary Proxy ExecutionT1218.001 Compiled HTML FileT1218.002 Control PanelT1218.003 CMSTPT1218.004 InstallUtilT1218.005 MshtaT1218.008 OdbcconfT1218.009 Regsvcs/RegasmT1218.012 VerclsidT1218.013 MavinjectT1218.014 MMCT1219 Remote Access SoftwareT1220 XSL Script ProcessingT1505.004 IIS ComponentsT1546.002 ScreensaverT1546.006 LC_LOAD_DYLIB AdditionT1546.008 Accessibility FeaturesT1546.009 AppCert DLLsT1546.010 AppInit DLLsT1547.004 Winlogon Helper DLLT1547.006 Kernel Modules and ExtensionsT1548 Abuse Elevation Control MechanismT1548.004 Elevated Execution with PromptT1553 Subvert Trust ControlsT1553.001 Gatekeeper BypassT1553.003 SIP and Trust Provider HijackingT1553.005 Mark-of-the-Web BypassT1562 Impair DefensesT1562.001 Disable or Modify ToolsT1562.011 Spoof Security AlertingT1564.003 Hidden WindowT1564.006 Run Virtual InstanceT1574 Hijack Execution FlowT1574.001 DLL Search Order HijackingT1574.006 Dynamic Linker HijackingT1574.007 Path Interception by PATH Environment VariableT1574.008 Path Interception by Search Order HijackingT1574.009 Path Interception by Unquoted PathT1574.012 COR_PROFILERT1609 Container Administration CommandT1611 Escape to Host

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1038

T1129Execution through Module Load Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Directly mitigating module loads and API calls related to module loads will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying and correlated subsequent behavior to determine if it is the result of malicious activity.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1129

T1041Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Mitigations for command and control apply. Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1041

T1011Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Ensure host-based sensors maintain visibility into usage of all network adapters and prevent the creation of new ones where possible.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1011

T1052Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary. Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if they are not required for business operations.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1052

M1050Exploit Protection · counters 11 techniques

Use capabilities to detect and block conditions that may lead to or be indicative of a software exploit occurring.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1050

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Application isolation and least privilege help lesson the impact of an exploit. Application isolation will limit what other processes and system features the exploited target can access, and least privilege for service accounts will limit what permissions the exploited process gets on the rest of the system. Web Application Firewalls may be used to limit exposure of applications.

Segment externally facing servers and services from the rest of the network with a DMZ or on separate hosting infrastructure.

Use secure coding best practices when designing custom software that is meant for deployment to externally facing systems. Avoid issues documented by OWASP, CWE, and other software weakness identification efforts.

Regularly scan externally facing systems for vulnerabilities and establish procedures to rapidly patch systems when critical vulnerabilities are discovered through scanning and through public disclosure.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1190

T1203Exploitation for Client Execution Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Browser sandboxes can be used to mitigate some of the impact of exploitation, but sandbox escapes may still exist.

Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of client-side exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist.

Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1203

T1212Exploitation for Credential Access Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, if available. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist.

Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for software targeted for defense evasion.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1212

T1211Exploitation for Defense Evasion Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, if available. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist.

Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for software targeted for defense evasion.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1211

T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, if available. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of client-side exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist.

Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for software components targeted for privilege escalation.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1068

T1210Exploitation of Remote Services Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Segment networks and systems appropriately to reduce access to critical systems and services to controlled methods. Minimize available services to only those that are necessary. Regularly scan the internal network for available services to identify new and potentially vulnerable services. Minimize permissions and access for service accounts to limit impact of exploitation.

Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, if available. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist.

Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for all software or services targeted.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1210

T1133External Remote Services Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Limit access to remote services through centrally managed concentrators such as VPNs and other managed remote access systems. Deny direct remote access to internal systems through the use of network proxies, gateways, and firewalls. Disable or block remotely available services such as Windows Remote Management. Use strong two-factor or multi-factor authentication for remote service accounts to mitigate an adversary's ability to leverage stolen credentials, but be aware of Multi-Factor Authentication Interception techniques for some two-factor authentication implementations.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1133

T1181Extra Window Memory Injection Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.

Although EWM injection may be used to evade certain types of defenses, it is still good practice to identify potentially malicious software that may be used to perform adversarial actions and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1181

T1008Fallback Channels Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1008

T1083File and Directory Discovery Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

File system activity is a common part of an operating system, so it is unlikely that mitigation would be appropriate for this technique. It may still be beneficial to identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1083

T1107File Deletion Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to delete files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting tools like AppLocker or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1107

T1006File System Logical Offsets Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify potentially malicious software that may be used to access logical drives in this manner, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1006

T1044File System Permissions Weakness Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Use auditing tools capable of detecting file system permissions abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service binary target path locations. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for service file system permissions weaknesses.

Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through abuse of file, directory, and service permissions by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs. Deny execution from user directories such as file download directories and temp directories where able.

Turn off UAC's privilege elevation for standard users [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System]to automatically deny elevation requests, add: "ConsentPromptBehaviorUser"=dword:00000000 . Consider enabling installer detection for all users by adding: "EnableInstallerDetection"=dword:00000001. This will prompt for a password for installation and also log the attempt. To disable installer detection, instead add: "EnableInstallerDetection"=dword:00000000. This may prevent potential elevation of privileges through exploitation during the process of UAC detecting the installer, but will allow the installation process to continue without being logged.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1044

M1037Filter Network Traffic · counters 40 techniques

Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1037

T1495Firmware Corruption Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts or access necessary to perform this technique. Check the integrity of the existing BIOS and device firmware to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. Patch the BIOS and other firmware as necessary to prevent successful use of known vulnerabilities.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1495

T1187Forced Authentication Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Block SMB traffic from exiting an enterprise network with egress filtering or by blocking TCP ports 139, 445 and UDP port 137. Filter or block WebDAV protocol traffic from exiting the network. If access to external resources over SMB and WebDAV is necessary, then traffic should be tightly limited with whitelisting.

For internal traffic, monitor the workstation-to-workstation unusual (vs. baseline) SMB traffic. For many networks there should not be any, but it depends on how systems on the network are configured and where resources are located.

Use strong passwords to increase the difficulty of credential hashes from being cracked if they are obtained.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1187

T1144Gatekeeper Bypass Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Other tools should be used to supplement Gatekeeper's functionality. Additionally, system settings can prevent applications from running that haven't been downloaded through the Apple Store which can help mitigate some of these issues.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1144

T1061Graphical User Interface Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Prevent adversaries from gaining access to credentials through Credential Access that can be used to log into remote desktop sessions on systems.

Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to log into remote interactive sessions, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker and Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1061

T1200Hardware Additions Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Establish network access control policies, such as using device certificates and the 802.1x standard. Restrict use of DHCP to registered devices to prevent unregistered devices from communicating with trusted systems.

Block unknown devices and accessories by endpoint security configuration and monitoring agent.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1200

T1158Hidden Files and Directories Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Mitigation of this technique may be difficult and unadvised due to the the legitimate use of hidden files and directories.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1158

T1147Hidden Users Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

If the computer is domain joined, then group policy can help restrict the ability to create or hide users. Similarly, preventing the modification of the /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow Hide500Users value will force all users to be visible.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1147

T1143Hidden Window Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Whitelist programs that are allowed to have this plist tag. All other programs should be considered suspicious.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1143

T1148HISTCONTROL Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Prevent users from changing the HISTCONTROL environment variable . Also, make sure that the HISTCONTROL environment variable is set to “ignoredup” instead of “ignoreboth” or “ignorespace”.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1148

T1179Hooking Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating all hooking will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1179

T1062Hypervisor Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to install a hypervisor.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1062

T1183Image File Execution Options Injection Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating all IFEO will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.

Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through IFEO by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown executables.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1183

T1054Indicator Blocking Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Ensure event tracers/forwarders , firewall policies, and other associated mechanisms are secured with appropriate permissions and access controls. Consider automatically relaunching forwarding mechanisms at recurring intervals (ex: temporal, on-logon, etc.) as well as applying appropriate change management to firewall rules and other related system configurations.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1054

T1066Indicator Removal from Tools Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Mitigation is difficult in instances like this because the adversary may have access to the system through another channel and can learn what techniques or tools are blocked by resident defenses. Exercising best practices with configuration and security as well as ensuring that proper process is followed during investigation of potential compromise is essential to detecting a larger intrusion through discrete alerts.

Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used by an adversary by using whitelisting tools like AppLocker or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1066

T1070Indicator Removal on Host Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Automatically forward events to a log server or data repository to prevent conditions in which the adversary can locate and manipulate data on the local system. When possible, minimize time delay on event reporting to avoid prolonged storage on the local system. Protect generated event files that are stored locally with proper permissions and authentication and limit opportunities for adversaries to increase privileges by preventing Privilege Escalation opportunities. Obfuscate/encrypt event files locally and in transit to avoid giving feedback to an adversary.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1070

T1202Indirect Command Execution Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify or block potentially malicious software that may contain abusive functionality by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate. . These mechanisms can also be used to disable and/or limit user access to Windows utilities and file types/locations used to invoke malicious execution.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1202

T1490Inhibit System Recovery Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Consider technical controls to prevent the disabling of services or deletion of files involved in system recovery.

Consider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for taking regular data backups that can be used to restore organizational data. Ensure backups are stored off system and is protected from common methods adversaries may use to gain access and destroy the backups to prevent recovery.

Identify potentially malicious software and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1490

T1141Input Prompt Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

This technique exploits users' tendencies to always supply credentials when prompted, which makes it very difficult to mitigate. Use user training as a way to bring awareness and raise suspicion for potentially malicious events (ex: Office documents prompting for credentials).

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1141

T1130Install Root Certificate Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) is one method to mitigate potential man-in-the-middle situations where and adversary uses a mis-issued or fraudulent certificate to intercept encrypted communications by enforcing use of an expected certificate.

Windows Group Policy can be used to manage root certificates and the Flags value of HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\ProtectedRoots can be set to 1 to prevent non-administrator users from making further root installations into their own HKCU certificate store.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1130

T1118InstallUtil Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

InstallUtil may not be necessary within a given environment. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of InstallUtil.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1118

T1208Kerberoasting Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Ensure strong password length (ideally 25+ characters) and complexity for service accounts and that these passwords periodically expire. Also consider using Group Managed Service Accounts or another third party product such as password vaulting.

Limit service accounts to minimal required privileges, including membership in privileged groups such as Domain Administrators.

Enable AES Kerberos encryption (or another stronger encryption algorithm), rather than RC4, where possible.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1208

T1215Kernel Modules and Extensions Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Common tools for detecting Linux rootkits include: rkhunter , chrootkit , although rootkits may be designed to evade certain detection tools.

LKMs and Kernel extensions require root level permissions to be installed. Limit access to the root account and prevent users from loading kernel modules and extensions through proper privilege separation and limiting Privilege Escalation opportunities.

Application whitelisting and software restriction tools, such as SELinux, can also aide in restricting kernel module loading.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1215

T1142Keychain Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

The password for the user's login keychain can be changed from the user's login password. This increases the complexity for an adversary because they need to know an additional password.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1142

T1159Launch Agent Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Restrict user's abilities to create Launch Agents with group policy.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1159

T1160Launch Daemon Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create new Launch Daemons.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1160

T1152Launchctl Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Prevent users from installing their own launch agents or launch daemons and instead require them to be pushed out by group policy.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1152

T1161LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Enforce that all binaries be signed by the correct Apple Developer IDs, and whitelist applications via known hashes. Binaries can also be baselined for what dynamic libraries they require, and if an app requires a new dynamic library that wasn’t included as part of an update, it should be investigated.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1161

T1149LC_MAIN Hijacking Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Enforce valid digital signatures for signed code on all applications and only trust applications with signatures from trusted parties.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1149

M1035Limit Access to Resource Over Network · counters 16 techniques

Prevent access to file shares, remote access to systems, unnecessary services. Mechanisms to limit access may include use of network concentrators, RDP gateways, etc.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1035

M1034Limit Hardware Installation · counters 4 techniques

Block users or groups from installing or using unapproved hardware on systems, including USB devices.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1034

M1033Limit Software Installation · counters 6 techniques

Block users or groups from installing unapproved software.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1033

T1171LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Disable LLMNR and NetBIOS in local computer security settings or by group policy if they are not needed within an environment.

Use host-based security software to block LLMNR/NetBIOS traffic. Enabling SMB Signing can stop NTLMv2 relay attacks.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1171

T1168Local Job Scheduling Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized users can create scheduled jobs. Identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to schedule jobs using whitelisting tools.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1168

T1162Login Item Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Restrict users from being able to create their own login items. Additionally, holding the shift key during login prevents apps from opening automatically .

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1162

T1037Logon Scripts Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Restrict write access to logon scripts to specific administrators. Prevent access to administrator accounts by mitigating Credential Access techniques and limiting account access and permissions of Valid Accounts.

Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through logon script modification by using whitelisting tools like AppLocker that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1037

T1177LSASS Driver Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

On Windows 8.1 and Server 2012 R2, enable LSA Protection by setting the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\RunAsPPL to dword:00000001. LSA Protection ensures that LSA plug-ins and drivers are only loaded if they are digitally signed with a Microsoft signature and adhere to the Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) process guidance.

On Windows 10 and Server 2016, enable Windows Defender Credential Guard to run lsass.exe in an isolated virtualized environment without any device drivers.

Ensure safe DLL search mode is enabled HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\SafeDllSearchMode to mitigate risk that lsass.exe loads a malicious code library.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1177

T1185Man in the Browser Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Since browser pivoting requires a high integrity process to launch from, restricting user permissions and addressing Privilege Escalation and Bypass User Account Control opportunities can limit the exposure to this technique.

Close all browser sessions regularly and when they are no longer needed.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1185

T1036Masquerading Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

When creating security rules, avoid exclusions based on file name or file path. Require signed binaries. Use file system access controls to protect folders such as C:\Windows\System32. Use tools that restrict program execution via whitelisting by attributes other than file name.

Identify potentially malicious software that may look like a legitimate program based on name and location, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting tools like AppLocker or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1036

T1031Modify Existing Service Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Use auditing tools capable of detecting privilege and service abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service configurations. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain the PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for Privilege Escalation weaknesses.

Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through service abuse by using whitelisting tools like AppLocker that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1031

T1112Modify Registry Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Misconfiguration of permissions in the Registry may lead to opportunities for an adversary to execute code, like through Service Registry Permissions Weakness. Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for system components that may lead to privilege escalation.

Identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to modify the Registry by using whitelisting tools like AppLocker or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1112

T1170Mshta Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Mshta.exe may not be necessary within a given environment since its functionality is tied to older versions of Internet Explorer that have reached end of life. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of mshta.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1170

M1032Multi-factor Authentication · counters 41 techniques

Use two or more pieces of evidence to authenticate to a system; such as username and password in addition to a token from a physical smart card or token generator.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1032

T1188Multi-hop Proxy Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Traffic to known anonymity networks and C2 infrastructure can be blocked through the use of network black and white lists. It should be noted that this kind of blocking may be circumvented by other techniques like Domain Fronting.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1188

T1104Multi-Stage Channels Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Command and control infrastructure used in a multi-stage channel may be blocked if known ahead of time. If unique signatures are present in the C2 traffic, they could also be used as the basis of identifying and blocking the channel.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1104

T1026Multiband Communication Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1026

T1079Multilayer Encryption Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Use of encryption protocols may make typical network-based C2 detection more difficult due to a reduced ability to signature the traffic. Prior knowledge of adversary C2 infrastructure may be useful for domain and IP address blocking, but will likely not be an effective long-term solution because adversaries can change infrastructure often.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1079

T1128Netsh Helper DLL Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify and block potentially malicious software that may persist in this manner by using whitelisting tools capable of monitoring DLL loads by Windows utilities like AppLocker.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1128

T1498Network Denial of Service Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

When flood volumes exceed the capacity of the network connection being targeted, it is typically necessary to intercept the incoming traffic upstream to filter out the attack traffic from the legitimate traffic. Such defenses can be provided by the hosting Internet Service Provider (ISP) or by a 3rd party such as a Content Delivery Network (CDN) or providers specializing in DoS mitigations.

Depending on flood volume, on-premises filtering may be possible by blocking source addresses sourcing the attack, blocking ports that are being targeted, or blocking protocols being used for transport.

As immediate response may require rapid engagement of 3rd parties, analyze the risk associated to critical resources being affected by Network DoS attacks and create a disaster recovery plan/business continuity plan to respond to incidents.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1498

M1031Network Intrusion Prevention · counters 55 techniques

Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries.

T1001 Data ObfuscationT1001.001 Junk DataT1001.002 SteganographyT1001.003 Protocol ImpersonationT1008 Fallback ChannelsT1029 Scheduled TransferT1030 Data Transfer Size LimitsT1041 Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelT1046 Network Service DiscoveryT1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolT1048.001 Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 ProtocolT1048.002 Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 ProtocolT1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolT1071 Application Layer ProtocolT1071.001 Web ProtocolsT1071.002 File Transfer ProtocolsT1071.003 Mail ProtocolsT1071.004 DNST1090 ProxyT1090.001 Internal ProxyT1090.002 External ProxyT1095 Non-Application Layer ProtocolT1102 Web ServiceT1102.001 Dead Drop ResolverT1102.002 Bidirectional CommunicationT1102.003 One-Way CommunicationT1104 Multi-Stage ChannelsT1105 Ingress Tool TransferT1132 Data EncodingT1132.001 Standard EncodingT1132.002 Non-Standard EncodingT1204 User ExecutionT1204.001 Malicious LinkT1204.003 Malicious ImageT1219 Remote Access SoftwareT1221 Template InjectionT1542.004 ROMMONkitT1542.005 TFTP BootT1557 Adversary-in-the-MiddleT1557.001 LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB RelayT1557.002 ARP Cache PoisoningT1557.003 DHCP SpoofingT1566 PhishingT1566.001 Spearphishing AttachmentT1568 Dynamic ResolutionT1568.002 Domain Generation AlgorithmsT1570 Lateral Tool TransferT1571 Non-Standard PortT1572 Protocol TunnelingT1573 Encrypted ChannelT1573.001 Symmetric CryptographyT1573.002 Asymmetric CryptographyT1602 Data from Configuration RepositoryT1602.001 SNMP (MIB Dump)T1602.002 Network Device Configuration Dump

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1031

M1030Network Segmentation · counters 35 techniques

Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Configure separate virtual private cloud (VPC) instances to isolate critical cloud systems.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1030

T1046Network Service Scanning Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Use network intrusion detection/prevention systems to detect and prevent remote service scans. Ensure that unnecessary ports and services are closed and proper network segmentation is followed to protect critical servers and devices.

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about services running on remote systems, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1046

T1126Network Share Connection Removal Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Follow best practices for mitigation of activity related to establishing Windows Admin Shares.

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to leverage network shares, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1126

T1135Network Share Discovery Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire network share information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1135

T1040Network Sniffing Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Ensure that all wireless traffic is encrypted appropriately. Use Kerberos, SSL, and multifactor authentication wherever possible. Monitor switches and network for span port usage, ARP/DNS poisoning, and router reconfiguration.

Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to sniff or analyze network traffic by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1040

T1050New Service Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create new services.

Identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to create services by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1050

T1096NTFS File Attributes Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

It may be difficult or inadvisable to block access to EA and ADSs. Efforts should be focused on preventing potentially malicious software from running. Identify and block potentially malicious software that may contain functionality to hide information in EA and ADSs by using whitelisting tools like AppLocker or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

Consider adjusting read and write permissions for NTFS EA, though this should be tested to ensure routine OS operations are not impeded.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1096

M1028Operating System Configuration · counters 39 techniques

Make configuration changes related to the operating system or a common feature of the operating system that result in system hardening against techniques.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1028

T1075Pass the Hash Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Monitor systems and domain logs for unusual credential logon activity. Prevent access to Valid Accounts. Apply patch KB2871997 to Windows 7 and higher systems to limit the default access of accounts in the local administrator group.

Enable pass the hash mitigations to apply UAC restrictions to local accounts on network logon. The associated Registry key is located HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy Through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Administrative Templates > SCM: Pass the Hash Mitigations: Apply UAC restrictions to local accounts on network logons.

Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise and reduce the adversary's ability to perform Lateral Movement between systems. Ensure that built-in and created local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords. Do not allow a domain user to be in the local administrator group on multiple systems.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1075

T1097Pass the Ticket Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Monitor domains for unusual credential logons. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords. Do not allow a user to be a local administrator for multiple systems. Limit domain admin account permissions to domain controllers and limited servers. Delegate other admin functions to separate accounts.

For containing the impact of a previously generated golden ticket, reset the built-in KRBTGT account password twice, which will invalidate any existing golden tickets that have been created with the KRBTGT hash and other Kerberos tickets derived from it.

Attempt to identify and block unknown or malicious software that could be used to obtain Kerberos tickets and use them to authenticate by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1097

T1174Password Filter DLL Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Ensure only valid password filters are registered. Filter DLLs must be present in Windows installation directory (C:\Windows\System32\ by default) of a domain controller and/or local computer with a corresponding entry in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1174

M1027Password Policies · counters 44 techniques

Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1027

T1201Password Policy Discovery Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Mitigating discovery of password policies is not advised since the information is required to be known by systems and users of a network. Ensure password policies are such that they mitigate brute force attacks yet will not give an adversary an information advantage because the policies are too light. Active Directory is a common way to set and enforce password policies throughout an enterprise network.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1201

T1034Path Interception Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Eliminate path interception weaknesses in program configuration files, scripts, the PATH environment variable, services, and in shortcuts by surrounding PATH variables with quotation marks when functions allow for them . Be aware of the search order Windows uses for executing or loading binaries and use fully qualified paths wherever appropriate . Clean up old Windows Registry keys when software is uninstalled to avoid keys with no associated legitimate binaries.

Periodically search for and correct or report path interception weaknesses on systems that may have been introduced using custom or available tools that report software using insecure path configurations .

Require that all executables be placed in write-protected directories. Ensure that proper permissions and directory access control are set to deny users the ability to write files to the top-level directory C: and system directories, such as C:\Windows\, to reduce places where malicious files could be placed for execution.

Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through the path interception by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker or Software Restriction Policies, that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown executables.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1034

T1120Peripheral Device Discovery Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about peripheral devices, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1120

T1069Permission Groups Discovery Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about groups and permissions, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1069

T1150Plist Modification Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Prevent plist files from being modified by users by making them read-only.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1150

T1205Port Knocking Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Mitigation of some variants of this technique could be achieved through the use of stateful firewalls, depending upon how it is implemented.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1205

T1013Port Monitors Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify and block potentially malicious software that may persist in this manner by using whitelisting tools capable of monitoring DLL loads by processes running under SYSTEM permissions.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1013

T1086PowerShell Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

It may be possible to remove PowerShell from systems when not needed, but a review should be performed to assess the impact to an environment, since it could be in use for many legitimate purposes and administrative functions. When PowerShell is necessary, restrict PowerShell execution policy to administrators and to only execute signed scripts. Be aware that there are methods of bypassing the PowerShell execution policy, depending on environment configuration. Disable/restrict the WinRM Service to help prevent uses of PowerShell for remote execution.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1086

M1056Pre-compromise · counters 82 techniques

This category is used for any applicable mitigation activities that apply to techniques occurring before an adversary gains Initial Access, such as Reconnaissance and Resource Development techniques.

T1583 Acquire InfrastructureT1583.001 DomainsT1583.002 DNS ServerT1583.003 Virtual Private ServerT1583.004 ServerT1583.005 BotnetT1583.006 Web ServicesT1583.007 ServerlessT1583.008 MalvertisingT1584 Compromise InfrastructureT1584.001 DomainsT1584.002 DNS ServerT1584.003 Virtual Private ServerT1584.004 ServerT1584.005 BotnetT1584.006 Web ServicesT1584.007 ServerlessT1585 Establish AccountsT1585.001 Social Media AccountsT1585.002 Email AccountsT1585.003 Cloud AccountsT1586 Compromise AccountsT1586.001 Social Media AccountsT1586.002 Email AccountsT1586.003 Cloud AccountsT1587 Develop CapabilitiesT1587.001 MalwareT1587.002 Code Signing CertificatesT1587.003 Digital CertificatesT1587.004 ExploitsT1588 Obtain CapabilitiesT1588.001 MalwareT1588.002 ToolT1588.003 Code Signing CertificatesT1588.004 Digital CertificatesT1588.005 ExploitsT1588.006 VulnerabilitiesT1589 Gather Victim Identity InformationT1589.001 CredentialsT1589.002 Email AddressesT1589.003 Employee NamesT1590 Gather Victim Network InformationT1590.001 Domain PropertiesT1590.002 DNST1590.003 Network Trust DependenciesT1590.004 Network TopologyT1590.005 IP AddressesT1590.006 Network Security AppliancesT1591 Gather Victim Org InformationT1591.001 Determine Physical LocationsT1591.002 Business RelationshipsT1591.003 Identify Business TempoT1591.004 Identify RolesT1592 Gather Victim Host InformationT1592.001 HardwareT1592.002 SoftwareT1592.003 FirmwareT1592.004 Client ConfigurationsT1593.001 Social MediaT1593.002 Search EnginesT1594 Search Victim-Owned WebsitesT1595 Active ScanningT1595.001 Scanning IP BlocksT1595.002 Vulnerability ScanningT1595.003 Wordlist ScanningT1596 Search Open Technical DatabasesT1596.001 DNS/Passive DNST1596.002 WHOIST1596.003 Digital CertificatesT1596.004 CDNsT1596.005 Scan DatabasesT1597 Search Closed SourcesT1597.001 Threat Intel VendorsT1597.002 Purchase Technical DataT1608 Stage CapabilitiesT1608.001 Upload MalwareT1608.002 Upload ToolT1608.003 Install Digital CertificateT1608.004 Drive-by TargetT1608.005 Link TargetT1608.006 SEO PoisoningT1650 Acquire Access

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1056

T1145Private Keys Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Use strong passphrases for private keys to make cracking difficult. When possible, store keys on separate cryptographic hardware instead of on the local system. Ensure only authorized keys are allowed access to critical resources and audit access lists regularly. Ensure permissions are properly set on folders containing sensitive private keys to prevent unintended access. Use separate infrastructure for managing critical systems to prevent overlap of credentials and permissions on systems that could be used as vectors for lateral movement. Follow other best practices for mitigating access through use of Valid Accounts.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1145

M1026Privileged Account Management · counters 105 techniques

Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root.

T1003 OS Credential DumpingT1003.001 LSASS MemoryT1003.002 Security Account ManagerT1003.003 NTDST1003.004 LSA SecretsT1003.005 Cached Domain CredentialsT1003.006 DCSyncT1003.007 Proc FilesystemT1003.008 /etc/passwd and /etc/shadowT1021.001 Remote Desktop ProtocolT1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin SharesT1021.003 Distributed Component Object ModelT1021.006 Windows Remote ManagementT1021.007 Cloud ServicesT1047 Windows Management InstrumentationT1053 Scheduled Task/JobT1053.002 AtT1053.005 Scheduled TaskT1053.006 Systemd TimersT1053.007 Container Orchestration JobT1055 Process InjectionT1055.008 Ptrace System CallsT1056.003 Web Portal CaptureT1059 Command and Scripting InterpreterT1059.001 PowerShellT1059.008 Network Device CLIT1059.009 Cloud APIT1072 Software Deployment ToolsT1078 Valid AccountsT1078.002 Domain AccountsT1078.003 Local AccountsT1078.004 Cloud AccountsT1098 Account ManipulationT1098.001 Additional Cloud CredentialsT1098.002 Additional Email Delegate PermissionsT1098.003 Additional Cloud RolesT1134 Access Token ManipulationT1134.001 Token Impersonation/TheftT1134.002 Create Process with TokenT1134.003 Make and Impersonate TokenT1136 Create AccountT1136.001 Local AccountT1136.002 Domain AccountT1136.003 Cloud AccountT1190 Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationT1210 Exploitation of Remote ServicesT1218 System Binary Proxy ExecutionT1218.007 MsiexecT1222 File and Directory Permissions ModificationT1222.001 Windows File and Directory Permissions ModificationT1222.002 Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions ModificationT1484 Domain Policy ModificationT1484.002 Domain Trust ModificationT1495 Firmware CorruptionT1505 Server Software ComponentT1505.001 SQL Stored ProceduresT1505.002 Transport AgentT1505.004 IIS ComponentsT1525 Implant Internal ImageT1542 Pre-OS BootT1542.001 System FirmwareT1542.003 BootkitT1542.005 TFTP BootT1543.002 Systemd ServiceT1546.003 Windows Management Instrumentation Event SubscriptionT1547.006 Kernel Modules and ExtensionsT1548 Abuse Elevation Control MechanismT1548.002 Bypass User Account ControlT1548.003 Sudo and Sudo CachingT1550 Use Alternate Authentication MaterialT1550.002 Pass the HashT1550.003 Pass the TicketT1552 Unsecured CredentialsT1552.002 Credentials in RegistryT1552.007 Container APIT1553.006 Code Signing Policy ModificationT1556 Modify Authentication ProcessT1556.001 Domain Controller AuthenticationT1556.003 Pluggable Authentication ModulesT1556.004 Network Device AuthenticationT1556.005 Reversible EncryptionT1556.007 Hybrid IdentityT1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos TicketsT1558.001 Golden TicketT1558.002 Silver TicketT1558.003 KerberoastingT1559 Inter-Process CommunicationT1559.001 Component Object ModelT1562.009 Safe Mode BootT1563 Remote Service Session HijackingT1563.001 SSH HijackingT1563.002 RDP HijackingT1569 System ServicesT1569.002 Service ExecutionT1599 Network Boundary BridgingT1599.001 Network Address Translation TraversalT1601 Modify System ImageT1601.001 Patch System ImageT1601.002 Downgrade System ImageT1606 Forge Web CredentialsT1606.002 SAML TokensT1609 Container Administration CommandT1611 Escape to HostT1612 Build Image on HostT1651 Cloud Administration Command

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1026

M1025Privileged Process Integrity · counters 7 techniques

Protect processes with high privileges that can be used to interact with critical system components through use of protected process light, anti-process injection defenses, or other process integrity enforcement measures.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1025

T1057Process Discovery Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about processes, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1057

T1186Process Doppelgänging Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls or patched since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate process-loading mechanisms from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.

Although Process Doppelgänging may be used to evade certain types of defenses, it is still good practice to identify potentially malicious software that may be used to perform adversarial actions and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1186

T1093Process Hollowing Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.

Although process hollowing may be used to evade certain types of defenses, it is still good practice to identify potentially malicious software that may be used to perform adversarial actions and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1093

T1012Query Registry Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information within the Registry, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1012

T1163Rc.common Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Limit privileges of user accounts so only authorized users can edit the rc.common file.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1163

T1164Re-opened Applications Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Holding the Shift key while logging in prevents apps from opening automatically . This feature can be disabled entirely with the following terminal command: defaults write -g ApplePersistence -bool no.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1164

T1108Redundant Access Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used as a remote access tool, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and will be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1108

T1060Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through run key or startup folder persistence using whitelisting tools like AppLocker or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1060

T1121Regsvcs/Regasm Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Regsvcs and Regasm may not be necessary within a given environment. Block execution of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1121

T1117Regsvr32 Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Microsoft's Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block regsvr32.exe from being used to bypass whitelisting.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1117

T1219Remote Access Tools Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Properly configure firewalls, application firewalls, and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to sites and services used by remote access tools.

Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures may be able to prevent traffic to these services as well.

Use application whitelisting to mitigate use of and installation of unapproved software.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1219

M1029Remote Data Storage · counters 11 techniques

Use remote security log and sensitive file storage where access can be controlled better to prevent exposure of intrusion detection log data or sensitive information.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1029

T1076Remote Desktop Protocol Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Disable the RDP service if it is unnecessary, remove unnecessary accounts and groups from Remote Desktop Users groups, and enable firewall rules to block RDP traffic between network security zones. Audit the Remote Desktop Users group membership regularly. Remove the local Administrators group from the list of groups allowed to log in through RDP. Limit remote user permissions if remote access is necessary. Use remote desktop gateways and multifactor authentication for remote logins. Do not leave RDP accessible from the internet. Change GPOs to define shorter timeouts sessions and maximum amount of time any single session can be active. Change GPOs to specify the maximum amount of time that a disconnected session stays active on the RD session host server.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1076

T1105Remote File Copy Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware or unusual data transfer over known tools and protocols like FTP can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1105

T1018Remote System Discovery Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information on remotely available systems, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1018

T1091Replication Through Removable Media Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary. Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if it is not required for business operations.

Identify potentially malicious software that may be used to infect removable media or may result from tainted removable media, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1091

T1496Resource Hijacking Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify potentially malicious software and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1496

M1022Restrict File and Directory Permissions · counters 56 techniques

Restrict access by setting directory and file permissions that are not specific to users or privileged accounts.

T1036 MasqueradingT1036.003 Rename System UtilitiesT1036.005 Match Legitimate Name or LocationT1037 Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsT1037.002 Login HookT1037.003 Network Logon ScriptT1037.004 RC ScriptsT1037.005 Startup ItemsT1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolT1053.006 Systemd TimersT1055.009 Proc MemoryT1070 Indicator RemovalT1070.001 Clear Windows Event LogsT1070.002 Clear Linux or Mac System LogsT1070.003 Clear Command HistoryT1070.008 Clear Mailbox DataT1070.009 Clear PersistenceT1080 Taint Shared ContentT1098.004 SSH Authorized KeysT1218.002 Control PanelT1222 File and Directory Permissions ModificationT1222.001 Windows File and Directory Permissions ModificationT1222.002 Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions ModificationT1489 Service StopT1530 Data from Cloud StorageT1543 Create or Modify System ProcessT1543.001 Launch AgentT1543.002 Systemd ServiceT1546.004 Unix Shell Configuration ModificationT1546.013 PowerShell ProfileT1547.003 Time ProvidersT1547.013 XDG Autostart EntriesT1548 Abuse Elevation Control MechanismT1548.003 Sudo and Sudo CachingT1552 Unsecured CredentialsT1552.001 Credentials In FilesT1552.004 Private KeysT1553.003 SIP and Trust Provider HijackingT1556 Modify Authentication ProcessT1562 Impair DefensesT1562.001 Disable or Modify ToolsT1562.002 Disable Windows Event LoggingT1562.004 Disable or Modify System FirewallT1562.006 Indicator BlockingT1563.001 SSH HijackingT1564.004 NTFS File AttributesT1565 Data ManipulationT1565.001 Stored Data ManipulationT1565.003 Runtime Data ManipulationT1569 System ServicesT1569.002 Service ExecutionT1574 Hijack Execution FlowT1574.004 Dylib HijackingT1574.007 Path Interception by PATH Environment VariableT1574.008 Path Interception by Search Order HijackingT1574.009 Path Interception by Unquoted Path

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1022

M1044Restrict Library Loading · counters 3 techniques

Prevent abuse of library loading mechanisms in the operating system and software to load untrusted code by configuring appropriate library loading mechanisms and investigating potential vulnerable software.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1044

M1024Restrict Registry Permissions · counters 20 techniques

Restrict the ability to modify certain hives or keys in the Windows Registry.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1024

M1021Restrict Web-Based Content · counters 23 techniques

Restrict use of certain websites, block downloads/attachments, block Javascript, restrict browser extensions, etc.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1021

T1014Rootkit Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify potentially malicious software that may contain rootkit functionality, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1014

T1085Rundll32 Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Microsoft's Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block methods of using rundll32.exe to bypass whitelisting.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1085

T1494Runtime Data Manipulation Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify critical business and system processes that may be targeted by adversaries and work to secure those systems against tampering. Prevent critical business and system processes from being replaced, overwritten, or reconfigured to load potentially malicious code. Identify potentially malicious software and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1494

T1053Scheduled Task Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create scheduled tasks on remote systems. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for permission weaknesses in scheduled tasks that could be used to escalate privileges.

Configure settings for scheduled tasks to force tasks to run under the context of the authenticated account instead of allowing them to run as SYSTEM. The associated Registry key is located at HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\SubmitControl. The setting can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options: Domain Controller: Allow server operators to schedule tasks, set to disabled.

Configure the Increase Scheduling Priority option to only allow the Administrators group the rights to schedule a priority process. This can be can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Increase scheduling priority.

Identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to schedule tasks using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1053

T1029Scheduled Transfer Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1029

T1113Screen Capture Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Blocking software based on screen capture functionality may be difficult, and there may be legitimate software that performs those actions. Instead, identify potentially malicious software that may have functionality to acquire screen captures, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1113

T1180Screensaver Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Block .scr files from being executed from non-standard locations. Set Group Policy to force users to have a dedicated screensaver where local changes should not override the settings to prevent changes. Use Group Policy to disable screensavers if they are unnecessary.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1180

T1064Scripting Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Turn off unused features or restrict access to scripting engines such as VBScript or scriptable administration frameworks such as PowerShell.

Configure Office security settings enable Protected View, to execute within a sandbox environment, and to block macros through Group Policy. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of compromise. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1064

T1063Security Software Discovery Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about local security software, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1063

T1101Security Support Provider Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, and later versions may make LSA run as a Protected Process Light (PPL) by setting the Registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\RunAsPPL, which requires all SSP DLLs to be signed by Microsoft.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1101

T1035Service Execution Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Ensure that permissions disallow services that run at a higher permissions level from being created or interacted with by a user with a lower permission level. Also ensure that high permission level service binaries cannot be replaced or modified by users with a lower permission level.

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to interact with Windows services, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1035

T1058Service Registry Permissions Weakness Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for system components that may lead to privilege escalation.

Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through service abuse by using whitelisting tools like AppLocker that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown programs.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1058

T1489Service Stop Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Ensure proper process, registry, and file permissions are in place to inhibit adversaries from disabling or interfering with critical services. Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service configurations. Harden systems used to serve critical network, business, and communications functions. Operate intrusion detection, analysis, and response systems on a separate network from the production environment to lessen the chances that an adversary can see and interfere with critical response functions.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1489

T1166Setuid and Setgid Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Applications with known vulnerabilities or known shell escapes should not have the setuid or setgid bits set to reduce potential damage if an application is compromised. Additionally, the number of programs with setuid or setgid bits set should be minimized across a system.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1166

T1051Shared Webroot Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Networks that allow for open development and testing of Web content and allow users to set up their own Web servers on the enterprise network may be particularly vulnerable if the systems and Web servers are not properly secured to limit privileged account use, unauthenticated network share access, and network/system isolation.

Ensure proper permissions on directories that are accessible through a Web server. Disallow remote access to the webroot or other directories used to serve Web content. Disable execution on directories within the webroot. Ensure that permissions of the Web server process are only what is required by not using built-in accounts; instead, create specific accounts to limit unnecessary access or permissions overlap across multiple systems.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1051

T1023Shortcut Modification Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Limit permissions for who can create symbolic links in Windows to appropriate groups such as Administrators and necessary groups for virtualization. This can be done through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Create symbolic links.

Identify and block unknown, potentially malicious software that may be executed through shortcut modification by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1023

T1178SID-History Injection Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Clean up SID-History attributes after legitimate account migration is complete.

Consider applying SID Filtering to interforest trusts, such as forest trusts and external trusts, to exclude SID-History from requests to access domain resources. SID Filtering ensures that any authentication requests over a trust only contain SIDs of security principals from the trusted domain (i.e. preventing the trusted domain from claiming a user has membership in groups outside of the domain).

SID Filtering of forest trusts is enabled by default, but may have been disabled in some cases to allow a child domain to transitively access forest trusts. SID Filtering of external trusts is automatically enabled on all created external trusts using Server 2003 or later domain controllers. However note that SID Filtering is not automatically applied to legacy trusts or may have been deliberately disabled to allow inter-domain access to resources.

SID Filtering can be applied by:

* Disabling SIDHistory on forest trusts using the netdom tool (netdom trust <TrustingDomainName> /domain:<TrustedDomainName> /EnableSIDHistory:no on the domain controller). * Applying SID Filter Quarantining to external trusts using the netdom tool (netdom trust <TrustingDomainName> /domain:<TrustedDomainName> /quarantine:yes on the domain controller) Applying SID Filtering to domain trusts within a single forest is not recommended as it is an unsupported configuration and can cause breaking changes. If a domain within a forest is untrustworthy then it should not be a member of the forest. In this situation it is necessary to first split the trusted and untrusted domains into separate forests where SID Filtering can be applied to an interforest trust.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1178

T1216Signed Script Proxy Execution Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Certain signed scripts that can be used to execute other programs may not be necessary within a given environment. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of these scripts if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1216

T1198SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys related to SIP and trust provider components. Also ensure that these values contain their full path to prevent DLL Search Order Hijacking.

Consider removing unnecessary and/or stale SIPs.

Restrict storage and execution of SIP DLLs to protected directories, such as C:\Windows, rather than user directories.

Enable whitelisting solutions such as AppLocker and/or Device Guard to block the loading of malicious SIP DLLs. Components may still be able to be hijacked to suitable functions already present on disk if malicious modifications to Registry keys are not prevented.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1198

M1054Software Configuration · counters 24 techniques

Implement configuration changes to software (other than the operating system) to mitigate security risks associated to how the software operates.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1054

T1045Software Packing Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Ensure updated virus definitions. Create custom signatures for observed malware. Employ heuristic-based malware detection.

Identify and prevent execution of potentially malicious software that may have been packed by using whitelisting tools like AppLocker or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1045

T1153Source Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Due to potential legitimate uses of source commands, it's may be difficult to mitigate use of this technique.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1153

T1151Space after Filename Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Prevent files from having a trailing space after the extension.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1151

T1193Spearphishing Attachment Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious email attachments can be used to block activity. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems.

Block unknown or unused attachments by default that should not be transmitted over email as a best practice to prevent some vectors, such as .scr, .exe, .pif, .cpl, etc. Some email scanning devices can open and analyze compressed and encrypted formats, such as zip and rar that may be used to conceal malicious attachments in Obfuscated Files or Information.

Because this technique involves user interaction on the endpoint, it's difficult to fully mitigate. However, there are potential mitigations. Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails. To prevent the attachments from executing, application whitelisting can be used. Anti-virus can also automatically quarantine suspicious files.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1193

T1192Spearphishing Link Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Because this technique involves user interaction on the endpoint, it's difficult to fully mitigate. However, there are potential mitigations. Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails with malicious links. Determine if certain websites that can be used for spearphishing are necessary for business operations and consider blocking access if activity cannot be monitored well or if it poses a significant risk. Other mitigations can take place as User Execution occurs.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1192

T1194Spearphishing via Service Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Determine if certain social media sites, personal webmail services, or other service that can be used for spearphishing is necessary for business operations and consider blocking access if activity cannot be monitored well or if it poses a significant risk.

Because this technique involves use of legitimate services and user interaction on the endpoint, it's difficult to fully mitigate. However, there are potential mitigations. Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails with malicious links. To prevent the downloads from executing, application whitelisting can be used. Anti-virus can also automatically quarantine suspicious files.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1194

T1184SSH Hijacking Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Ensure SSH key pairs have strong passwords and refrain from using key-store technologies such as ssh-agent unless they are properly protected. Ensure that all private keys are stored securely in locations where only the legitimate owner has access to with strong passwords and are rotated frequently. Ensure proper file permissions are set and harden system to prevent root privilege escalation opportunities. Do not allow remote access via SSH as root or other privileged accounts. Ensure that agent forwarding is disabled on systems that do not explicitly require this feature to prevent misuse.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1184

M1020SSL/TLS Inspection · counters 4 techniques

Break and inspect SSL/TLS sessions to look at encrypted web traffic for adversary activity.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1020

T1032Standard Cryptographic Protocol Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Use of encryption protocols may make typical network-based C2 detection more difficult due to a reduced ability to signature the traffic. Prior knowledge of adversary C2 infrastructure may be useful for domain and IP address blocking, but will likely not be an effective long-term solution because adversaries can change infrastructure often.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1032

T1095Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports and through proper network gateway systems. Also ensure hosts are only provisioned to communicate over authorized interfaces.

Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1095

T1165Startup Items Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Since StartupItems are deprecated, preventing all users from writing to the /Library/StartupItems directory would prevent any startup items from getting registered. Similarly, appropriate permissions should be applied such that only specific users can edit the startup items so that they can’t be leveraged for privilege escalation.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1165

T1492Stored Data Manipulation Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify critical business and system processes that may be targeted by adversaries and work to secure the data related to those processes against tampering. Ensure least privilege principles are applied to important information resources to reduce exposure to data manipulation risk. Consider encrypting important information to reduce an adversaries ability to perform tailor data modifications. Where applicable, examine using file monitoring software to check integrity on important files and directories as well as take corrective actions when unauthorized changes are detected.

Consider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for taking regular data backups that can be used to restore organizational data. Ensure backups are stored off system and is protected from common methods adversaries may use to gain access and manipulate backups.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1492

T1206Sudo Caching Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Setting the timestamp_timeout to 0 will require the user to input their password every time sudo is executed. Similarly, ensuring that the tty_tickets setting is enabled will prevent this leakage across tty sessions.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1206

T1169Sudo Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

The sudoers file should be strictly edited such that passwords are always required and that users can’t spawn risky processes as users with higher privilege. By requiring a password, even if an adversary can get terminal access, they must know the password to run anything in the sudoers file.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1169

T1195Supply Chain Compromise Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Apply supply chain risk management (SCRM) practices and procedures , such as supply chain analysis and appropriate risk management, throughout the life-cycle of a system.

Leverage established software development lifecycle (SDLC) practices :

* Uniquely Identify Supply Chain Elements, Processes, and Actors * Limit Access and Exposure within the Supply Chain * Establish and Maintain the Provenance of Elements, Processes, Tools, and Data * Share Information within Strict Limits * Perform SCRM Awareness and Training * Use Defensive Design for Systems, Elements, and Processes * Perform Continuous Integrator Review * Strengthen Delivery Mechanisms * Assure Sustainment Activities and Processes * Manage Disposal and Final Disposition Activities throughout the System or Element Life Cycle

A patch management process should be implemented to check unused dependencies, unmaintained and/or previously vulnerable dependencies, unnecessary features, components, files, and documentation. Continuous monitoring of vulnerability sources and the use of automatic and manual code review tools should also be implemented as well.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1195

T1019System Firmware Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts or access necessary to perform this technique. Check the integrity of the existing BIOS or EFI to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. Patch the BIOS and EFI as necessary. Use Trusted Platform Module technology.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1019

T1082System Information Discovery Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about the operating system and underlying hardware, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1082

T1016System Network Configuration Discovery Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about a system's network configuration, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1016

T1049System Network Connections Discovery Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about network connections, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1049

T1033System Owner/User Discovery Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about system users, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1033

T1007System Service Discovery Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about services, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1007

T1124System Time Discovery Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Benign software uses legitimate processes to gather system time. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system. Some common tools, such as net.exe, may be blocked by policy to prevent common ways of acquiring remote system time.

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire system time information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1124

T1501Systemd Service Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

The creation and modification of systemd service unit files is generally reserved for administrators such as the Linux root user and other users with superuser privileges. Limit user access to system utilities such as systemctl to only users who have a legitimate need. Restrict read/write access to systemd unit files to only select privileged users who have a legitimate need to manage system services. Additionally, the installation of software commonly adds and changes systemd service unit files. Restrict software installation to trusted repositories only and be cautious of orphaned software packages. Utilize malicious code protection and application whitelisting to mitigate the ability of malware to create or modify systemd services.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1501

T1080Taint Shared Content Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Protect shared folders by minimizing users who have write access. Use utilities that detect or mitigate common features used in exploitation, such as the Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET).

Reduce potential lateral movement risk by using web-based document management and collaboration services that do not use network file and directory sharing.

Identify potentially malicious software that may be used to taint content or may result from it and audit and/or block the unknown programs by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1080

T1221Template Injection Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Consider disabling Microsoft Office macros/active content to prevent the execution of malicious payloads in documents , though this setting may not mitigate the Forced Authentication use for this technique.

Because this technique involves user interaction on the endpoint, it's difficult to fully mitigate. However, there are potential mitigations including training users to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails. Network/Host intrusion prevention systems, antivirus, and detonation chambers can be employed to prevent documents from fetching and/or executing malicious payloads.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1221

T1072Third-party Software Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Evaluate the security of third-party software that could be used in the enterprise environment. Ensure that access to management systems for third-party systems is limited, monitored, and secure. Have a strict approval policy for use of third-party systems.

Grant access to Third-party systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of firewalls, account privilege separation, group policy, and multi-factor authentication. Verify that account credentials that may be used to access third-party systems are unique and not used throughout the enterprise network. Ensure that any accounts used by third-party providers to access these systems are traceable to the third-party and are not used throughout the network or used by other third-party providers in the same environment. Ensure third-party systems are regularly patched by users or the provider to prevent potential remote access through Exploitation for Privilege Escalation.

Ensure there are regular reviews of accounts provisioned to these systems to verify continued business need, and ensure there is governance to trace de-provisioning of access that is no longer required.

Where the third-party system is used for deployment services, ensure that it can be configured to deploy only signed binaries, then ensure that the trusted signing certificates are not co-located with the third-party system and are instead located on a system that cannot be accessed remotely or to which remote access is tightly controlled.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1072

M1019Threat Intelligence Program · counters 4 techniques

A threat intelligence program helps an organization generate their own threat intelligence information and track trends to inform defensive priorities to mitigate risk.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1019

T1209Time Providers Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed as a time provider by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.

Consider using Group Policy to configure and block subsequent modifications to W32Time parameters.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1209

T1099Timestomp Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Mitigation of timestomping specifically is likely difficult. Efforts should be focused on preventing potentially malicious software from running. Identify and block potentially malicious software that may contain functionality to perform timestomping by using whitelisting tools like AppLocker or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1099

T1493Transmitted Data Manipulation Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Identify critical business and system processes that may be targeted by adversaries and work to secure communications related to those processes against tampering. Encrypt all important data flows to reduce the impact of tailored modifications on data in transit.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1493

T1154Trap Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Due to potential legitimate uses of trap commands, it's may be difficult to mitigate use of this technique.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1154

T1199Trusted Relationship Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Network segmentation can be used to isolate infrastructure components that do not require broad network access. Properly manage accounts and permissions used by parties in trusted relationships to minimize potential abuse by the party and if the party is compromised by an adversary. Vet the security policies and procedures of organizations that are contracted for work that require privileged access to network resources.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1199

T1111Two-Factor Authentication Interception Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Remove smart cards when not in use. Protect devices and services used to transmit and receive out-of-band codes.

Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to intercept 2FA credentials on a system by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1111

T1065Uncommonly Used Port Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports.

Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1065

M1051Update Software · counters 32 techniques

Perform regular software updates to mitigate exploitation risk.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1051

M1052User Account Control · counters 7 techniques

Configure Windows User Account Control to mitigate risk of adversaries obtaining elevated process access.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1052

M1018User Account Management · counters 89 techniques

Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts.

T1020.001 Traffic DuplicationT1021 Remote ServicesT1021.001 Remote Desktop ProtocolT1021.004 SSHT1040 Network SniffingT1047 Windows Management InstrumentationT1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolT1053 Scheduled Task/JobT1053.002 AtT1053.003 CronT1053.005 Scheduled TaskT1053.006 Systemd TimersT1053.007 Container Orchestration JobT1059.008 Network Device CLIT1072 Software Deployment ToolsT1078 Valid AccountsT1078.004 Cloud AccountsT1087.004 Cloud AccountT1098 Account ManipulationT1098.001 Additional Cloud CredentialsT1098.003 Additional Cloud RolesT1098.004 SSH Authorized KeysT1110 Brute ForceT1110.004 Credential StuffingT1134 Access Token ManipulationT1134.001 Token Impersonation/TheftT1134.002 Create Process with TokenT1134.003 Make and Impersonate TokenT1185 Browser Session HijackingT1197 BITS JobsT1199 Trusted RelationshipT1213 Data from Information RepositoriesT1213.001 ConfluenceT1213.002 SharepointT1213.003 Code RepositoriesT1484 Domain Policy ModificationT1484.001 Group Policy ModificationT1489 Service StopT1490 Inhibit System RecoveryT1505 Server Software ComponentT1505.003 Web ShellT1528 Steal Application Access TokenT1530 Data from Cloud StorageT1537 Transfer Data to Cloud AccountT1538 Cloud Service DashboardT1543 Create or Modify System ProcessT1543.002 Systemd ServiceT1543.003 Windows ServiceT1543.004 Launch DaemonT1546.003 Windows Management Instrumentation Event SubscriptionT1547.004 Winlogon Helper DLLT1547.006 Kernel Modules and ExtensionsT1547.009 Shortcut ModificationT1547.012 Print ProcessorsT1547.013 XDG Autostart EntriesT1550 Use Alternate Authentication MaterialT1550.002 Pass the HashT1550.003 Pass the TicketT1552.007 Container APIT1556 Modify Authentication ProcessT1556.006 Multi-Factor AuthenticationT1562 Impair DefensesT1562.001 Disable or Modify ToolsT1562.002 Disable Windows Event LoggingT1562.004 Disable or Modify System FirewallT1562.006 Indicator BlockingT1562.007 Disable or Modify Cloud FirewallT1562.008 Disable Cloud LogsT1563 Remote Service Session HijackingT1563.002 RDP HijackingT1566.002 Spearphishing LinkT1569 System ServicesT1569.001 LaunchctlT1574 Hijack Execution FlowT1574.005 Executable Installer File Permissions WeaknessT1574.010 Services File Permissions WeaknessT1574.012 COR_PROFILERT1578 Modify Cloud Compute InfrastructureT1578.001 Create SnapshotT1578.002 Create Cloud InstanceT1578.003 Delete Cloud InstanceT1580 Cloud Infrastructure DiscoveryT1606 Forge Web CredentialsT1606.002 SAML TokensT1609 Container Administration CommandT1610 Deploy ContainerT1613 Container and Resource DiscoveryT1619 Cloud Storage Object DiscoveryT1648 Serverless Execution

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1018

T1204User Execution Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Use user training as a way to bring awareness to common phishing and spearphishing techniques and how to raise suspicion for potentially malicious events. Application whitelisting may be able to prevent the running of executables masquerading as other files.

If a link is being visited by a user, block unknown or unused files in transit by default that should not be downloaded or by policy from suspicious sites as a best practice to prevent some vectors, such as .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, etc. Some download scanning devices can open and analyze compressed and encrypted formats, such as zip and RAR that may be used to conceal malicious files in Obfuscated Files or Information.

If a link is being visited by a user, network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious downloads can be used to block activity. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct files in a way to avoid these systems.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1204

M1017User Training · counters 41 techniques

Train users to be aware of access or manipulation attempts by an adversary to reduce the risk of successful spearphishing, social engineering, and other techniques that involve user interaction.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1017

T1078Valid Accounts Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Take measures to detect or prevent techniques such as OS Credential Dumping or installation of keyloggers to acquire credentials through Input Capture. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent access if account credentials are obtained. Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled and use of accounts is segmented, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems.

Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers.

Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. These audits should also include if default accounts have been enabled, or if new local accounts are created that have not be authorized.

Applications and appliances that utilize default username and password should be changed immediately after the installation, and before deployment to a production environment. When possible, applications that use SSH keys should be updated periodically and properly secured.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1078

T1125Video Capture Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Mitigating this technique specifically may be difficult as it requires fine-grained API control. Efforts should be focused on preventing unwanted or unknown code from executing on a system.

Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to capture video and images by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1125

M1016Vulnerability Scanning · counters 5 techniques

Vulnerability scanning is used to find potentially exploitable software vulnerabilities to remediate them.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1016

T1102Web Service Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Firewalls and Web proxies can be used to enforce external network communication policy. It may be difficult for an organization to block particular services because so many of them are commonly used during the course of business.

Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol or encoded commands used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1102

T1100Web Shell Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Ensure that externally facing Web servers are patched regularly to prevent adversary access through Exploitation for Privilege Escalation to gain remote code access or through file inclusion weaknesses that may allow adversaries to upload files or scripts that are automatically served as Web pages.

Audit account and group permissions to ensure that accounts used to manage servers do not overlap with accounts and permissions of users in the internal network that could be acquired through Credential Access and used to log into the Web server and plant a Web shell or pivot from the Web server into the internal network.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1100

T1077Windows Admin Shares Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Do not reuse local administrator account passwords across systems. Ensure password complexity and uniqueness such that the passwords cannot be cracked or guessed. Deny remote use of local admin credentials to log into systems. Do not allow domain user accounts to be in the local Administrators group multiple systems.

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to leverage SMB and the Windows admin shares, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting tools, like AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1077

T1084Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Disabling WMI services may cause system instability and should be evaluated to assess the impact to a network. By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI; restrict other users that are allowed to connect, or disallow all users from connecting remotely to WMI. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1084

T1028Windows Remote Management Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Disable the WinRM service. If the service is necessary, lock down critical enclaves with separate WinRM infrastructure, accounts, and permissions. Follow WinRM best practices on configuration of authentication methods and use of host firewalls to restrict WinRM access to allow communication only to/from specific devices.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1028

T1004Winlogon Helper DLL Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Limit the privileges of user accounts so that only authorized administrators can perform Winlogon helper changes.

Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through the Winlogon helper process by using whitelisting tools like AppLocker that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1004

T1220XSL Script Processing Mitigation [deprecated] · counters 0 techniques

Windows Management Instrumentation and/or msxsl.exe may or may not be used within a given environment. Disabling WMI may cause system instability and should be evaluated to assess the impact to a network. If msxsl.exe is unnecessary, then block its execution to prevent abuse by adversaries.

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1220